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Abstract: On 16 May 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) de-
livered a long-awaited opinion on the legal nature of the free trade 
agreement between the EU and Singapore (Opinion 2/15). This deci-
sion was highly anticipated as it was expected to clarify uncertain-
ties of several aspects of the EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
which has broadened in scope after the Lisbon Treaty. The CJEU’s 
conclusion on the division of competences and its possible impacts 
on the CCP immediately sparked a debate within the Union’s insti-
tutions about its future direction. In particular, the architecture of EU 
free trade agreements, the dominant tool of the CCP at the beginning 
of the 21st century, is now under scrutiny. Trade deals without invest-
ment provisions could potentially simplify many steps which now bur-
den the treaty-making process. This paper discusses Opinion 2/15 
and its signiﬁ cance for the future development of the CCP. It explores 
and analyses the implications for shaping the post-Lisbon CCP with 
regard to two speciﬁ c areas: investment protection and sustainable 
development. The paper concludes that a new architecture for EU 
trade agreements could be further improved as there is a potential to 
preserve the CCP as both an operational and ambitious trade policy. 
In this respect, comprehensive FTAs encompassing trade, investment 
and sustainability deserve a second thought in the EU.
Keywords: Common Commercial Policy, free trade agreement, com-
petence, investment protection, sustainable development.
1 Introduction
On 16 May 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) delivered 
a long-awaited Opinion on the legal nature of the free trade agreement 
between the EU and Singapore (EUSFTA). The Opinion was expected to 
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bring clarity to the scope of the EU’s post-Lisbon Common Commercial 
Policy (CCP), which has been of paramount importance for the EU’s fu-
ture direction in current turbulent times.
According to the Opinion, the EU’s exclusive or shared competence 
covers all aspects of trade policy in its widest scope designed in recent 
EU free trade agreements (FTAs), the most prominent and important 
instrument for regulating trade and investment ﬂ ows. However, shared 
competence regarding the two parts of the agreement’s investment chap-
ter (indirect investment and the investor-state dispute settlement mech-
anism) changes the character of the agreement from being solely within 
the exclusive competence of the EU. Mixity, although it may have differ-
ent forms,1 in practice mostly leads to a situation where both the Member 
States and the Union are parties to an agreement.  Hence, one could 
easily conclude that without several investment provisions, the EUSFTA, 
as well as other EU FTAs, would merely be external agreements within 
the exclusive competence of the Union, with all the legal consequences 
which relate to the exclusive nature of agreements concluded by the EU. 
Most importantly, such trade deals would not need to be ratiﬁ ed by each 
Member State. In non-legal terms, exclusivity can be even understood as 
a prerequisite for the EU to be active internationally, enhancing the EU’s 
international agency. At the same time, it could also mean a shift of the 
democratic control from the Member States to the Union.2 
The Court’s conclusion and its impacts on the CCP under current 
circumstances immediately sparked a debate within the EU’s institu-
tions about the next steps for the CCP. The architecture of FTAs has now 
come under scrutiny, which is accentuated as current bilateral trade 
negotiations may face strong domestic opposition. The European Com-
mission’s request for an Opinion on the scope of the CCP was submit-
ted to the CJEU in the middle of heated public debate on the ﬁ nal text 
of the Comprehensive and Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) ne-
gotiated between the EU and Canada and the now frozen Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the 
EU and the US. Considering the backlash of civil society organisations 
against mega-regional trade and investment negotiations, particularly 
investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), it is 
easy to reach a conclusion that FTAs without investment provisions can 
simplify many aspects which currently burden the process and even put 
the EU’s ability to conclude such agreements at risk. 
1  See Section 3.3.
2  See eg Ramses A Wessel and Tamara Takács, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the EU’s Global 
Actorness: Increased Exclusivity in Trade and Investment and the Role of the European 
Parliament’ (2017) 28(2) Business Law Review 103.
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However, several other issues arise. For the sake of the exclusive 
nature of future FTAs, some elements of Member States’ competence 
such as anti-corruption3 are being left out of treaty negotiations. This 
could be detrimental to EU efforts to react to new trends in interna-
tional trade. In addition, the exclusion of national parliaments from the 
ratiﬁ cation process of FTAs, as a consequence of their exclusive nature, 
could raise serious domestic opposition and concerns over the legiti-
macy of those FTAs. Against this background, the paper will discuss 
Opinion 2/15 and its signiﬁ cance for the future development of the CCP. 
It will argue that the EU institutions have chosen the simplest way for-
ward by decoupling investment from the rest of the FTAs, based on the 
Court’s determination of the boundaries of exclusive EU competence. 
However, this option does not necessarily have to satisfy EU ambitions 
in trade and investment negotiations, or the expectations of the Europe-
an public for a more sustainable, inclusive and fairer CCP.4 This paper 
will argue that the old architecture of FTAs, enhanced by strong sus-
tainable development standards interlinked with investment protection, 
can provide the most suitable solution for the future. Such an approach 
to EU trade and investment negotiations has the potential to achieve a 
high level of EU ambitions as well as public acceptance, regardless of 
continuing mixity. 
The article is structured as follows. First, it sets the scene, provid-
ing a description of circumstances preceding the signature of the CETA 
which highlights deﬁ ciencies of ‘mixed’ FTAs. Discussion then follows on 
the precise context of Opinion 2/15 with respect to investment protection 
and sustainable development elements of FTAs, as well as the impact on 
the division of competences between Member States and the EU. There-
after, the implications in shaping the post-Lisbon CCP, particularly in 
terms of the new architecture of FTAs, are explored. In this part, we con-
sider the beneﬁ ts of covering investment and sustainable development 
issues under one comprehensive agreement, in contrast to the recent-
ly adopted practice of separating investment protection in stand-alone 
agreements. The paper concludes with recommendations for the CCP in 
3  As stated in the Commission’s strategy ‘Trade for All’ in October 2015 and further dis-
cussed in a workshop ‘Anti-corruption Provisions in EU Free Trade and Investment Agree-
ments: Delivering on Clean Trade’ organised for the European Parliament’s Committee on 
International Trade (INTA) in January 2018. The emerging trend of anti-corruption regula-
tion is also visible in recent texts of the CPTPP and USMCA.
4  European Trade Union Confederation, ‘ETUC Resolution for an EU progressive trade and 
investment policy’ (16 June 2017) <www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-resolution-eu-pro-
gressive-trade-and-investment-policy> accessed 15 September 2019; ‘Fair, Sustainable and 
Social: UNI Europa’s View on EU Trade Policies’ (23 November 2017) <www.uni-europa.
org/2017/11/23/fair-sustainable-social-uni-europas-view-eu-trade-policies/> accessed 
15 September 2019; The Greens, ‘Green Trade for All’ (12 June 2018); Commission, ‘Meet-
ing report - Civil Society Dialogue on TSD - 29 April 2019’ (21 May 2019).
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order for it to be an operational trade policy, and one of the stepping 
stones to the future prosperity of the EU.
2 On the road to the Court: CETA signature
The Lisbon Treaty signiﬁ cantly widened the scope of the CCP5 and 
presented signiﬁ cant progress in the consolidation of the CCP which took 
place during the years since the Amsterdam Treaty 1999. The inclusion 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) meant a huge step forward as both 
trade and investment were for the ﬁ rst time covered by the CCP. Based 
on the EU’s trade strategy ‘Global Europe’ adopted in 2006,6 the EU ini-
tiated a wave of bilateral trade negotiations.7 
The CETA is the ﬁ rst comprehensive trade and investment agree-
ment negotiated under the post-Lisbon EU trade policy. The negotiations 
started in 2009 and the ﬁ nal text was published in February 2016 af-
ter a last-minute revision of the investment chapter.8 Afterwards, the 
Commission submitted proposals regarding the signature, provisional 
application and conclusion of the CETA which treated the CETA as an 
agreement within the Union’s exclusive competence to the Council. As 
an EU-exclusive agreement, it would not have needed to be signed and 
ratiﬁ ed by both the EU and the Member States. The ratiﬁ cation proce-
dure in such cases requires only a qualiﬁ ed majority vote (QMV) in the 
Council and a simple majority in the European Parliament in order to 
give ‘assent’. Under this procedure set out in Article 218 TFEU, the Mem-
5  Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13.
6  ‘[Bilateral] Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), if approached with care, can build on WTO and 
other international rules by going further and faster in promoting openness and integra-
tion, by tackling issues which are not ready for multilateral discussion and by preparing 
the ground for the next level of multilateral liberalisation. Many key issues, including in-
vestment, public procurement, competition, other regulatory issues and IPR enforcement, 
which remain outside the WTO at this time, can be addressed through FTAs. […] We should 
continue to factor other issues and the wider role of trade policy in EU external relations 
into bilateral trade developments. […] In terms of content new competitiveness-driven FTAs 
would need to be comprehensive and ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest possible 
degree of trade liberalisation including far-reaching liberalisation of services and invest-
ment. […] FTAs should also tackle non-tariff barriers through regulatory convergence wher-
ever possible and contain strong trade facilitation provisions. FTAs should include stronger 
provisions for IPR and competition. […] In considering new FTAs, we will need to work to 
strengthen sustainable development through our bilateral trade relations. This could in-
clude incorporating new co-operative provisions in areas relating to labour standards and 
environmental protection.’ Commission, ‘Global Europe, Competing in the World’ (2006) 
10-12.
7  Marise Cremona, ‘Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017’ 
(2018) 14(1) European Constitutional Law Review 2.
8  Daniela Vincenti, ‘EU, Canada Change ISDS Clause, Get Closer to “Gold-plated Trade 
Deal”’, Euractiv (29 February 2016).
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ber States’ governments lose the right to veto, and the same applies de 
facto to their national (and regional) parliaments if they are involved in 
the ratiﬁ cation of international agreements. 
The role of national parliaments in making trade policy has tradi-
tionally been marginal. Negotiations, which are typically highly techni-
cal, were left for the Commission which consulted regularly with govern-
ments. National parliaments never challenged the adoption of FTAs. This 
practice changed during the TTIP debate when national parliaments be-
came increasingly engaged in the CCP.9 Questions regarding the legit-
imacy of the EU’s approach to exclusive competence over trade policy 
became louder in the public discourse. For example, on 25 June 2014, 
sixteen chambers of Member States’ national parliaments issued a letter 
to the then trade commissioner Karel de Gucht setting out the case for 
the mixity of the CETA and the TTIP and gave ‘great importance’ to rat-
iﬁ cation by national parliaments.10 Parliaments’ engagement grew from 
indifference to assertion. There can be no doubt that this development 
inﬂ uenced the position of the Member States’ governments in the Coun-
cil in the end-phase of the CETA talks.11
It thus came as no surprise when the Council strongly disagreed 
with the legal analysis presented by the Commission in its draft propos-
als for signature and ratiﬁ cation of the CETA as an exclusive agreement. 
For several months, the Council and the Commission debated the legal 
nature of the CETA and the scope of the respective competences of the 
Members States and the Union. Frustrated, Trade Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström admitted after several meetings that ‘the political situation 
in the Council is clear, and we understand the need for proposing it as a 
mixed agreement requiring Member States be party to the agreement, in 
order to allow for a speedy signature’.12 
9  Christilly Roederer-Rynning, Morten Kallestrup, ‘National Parliaments and the New Con-
tentiousness of Trade’ (2017) 39(7) Journal of European Integration 815.
10  Commissie Europese Zaken, ‘Letter in the Framework of the Political Dialogue: The 
Role of National Parliaments in Free Trade Agreements’ (25 June 2014) <www.ipex.eu/
IPEXL-WEB/scrutiny/COM20140153/huors.do> accessed 28 June 2018.
11  For instance, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that ‘[t]he participatory 
rights of the German Bundestag allow that we, as the federal government, will, of course, 
involve the Bundestag. The parliamentary vote will play an important role in the German 
voting behaviour in Brussels’. Die Bundesregierung, ‘Freihandelsabkommen CETA. Mer-
kel: Bundestag muss mitstimmen’ (30 June 2016) <www.bundesregierung.de/Content/
DE/Artikel/2016/06/2016-06-29-merkel-will-bei-ceta-bundestag-mitreden-lassen.html> 
accessed 28 June 2018.
12  Commission, ‘European Commission Proposes Signature and Conclusion of EU-Canada 
Trade Deal’ (5 July 2016) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1524> 
accessed 5 April 2018.
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Mixity in practice meant an approval initially by the Council, and 
the European Parliament, but also unanimously by the 38 national 
and regional parliaments.13 The necessary national ratiﬁ cation pro-
cess brought risks of the treaty being blocked by national and region-
al parliamentary objections or referendums with a veto-right for each 
Member State, effectively nullifying the qualiﬁ ed majority voting in the 
Council.14
The Commission found itself between a rock and a hard place. While 
the mixed nature of the CETA would have satisﬁ ed the Member States, 
it would also have the potential to backﬁ re almost immediately with se-
rious consequences for the CCP. First, Bulgaria and Romania had made 
it clear they would veto the CETA because of the failure by Canada to lift 
the visa requirement for their nationals. Next, the CETA was reviewed 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court on a request for temporary 
legal protection.15 The ﬁ nal and most serious obstacle was the Walloon 
parliament, a regional legislature in Belgium, which threatened to block 
the entire agreement because, under Belgium’s constitutional system, 
all seven regional and communal parliaments16 must give their consent 
to the federal government to sign an international treaty. After addi-
tional concessions and the last-minute-annexed Joint Interpretative In-
strument,17 the Commission was able to ensure that the path towards 
signature of the CETA could continue. 
The CETA was ﬁ nally signed at the EU-Canada Summit on 30 Octo-
ber 2016. However, the writing was now on the wall for the Commission’s 
13  David A Gantz, ‘The CETA Ratiﬁ cation Saga: The Demise of ISDS in EU Trade Agree-
ments?’ (2017) 40(2) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 362.
14  Guillaume Van Der Loo, Ramses A Wessel, ‘The Non-Ratiﬁ cation of Mixed Agreements: 
Legal Consequences and Solutions’ (2017) 54(3) Common Market Law Review 738.
15  BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 13 Oct 2016 − 2 BvR ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016. 
See also Andreas Schöpgens and Geert Van Calster, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Review and 
EU External Treaty Making After Opinion 2/15’ (2018) 23(4) European Foreign Affairs Re-
view 439.
16   Regions: Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels-Capital; Communities: French Community, Ger-
man-speaking Community, French Community Commission, Common Community Com-
mission.
17  Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States [2017] OJ L11/3. 
Part of the ﬁ nal compromise included the Belgium Government’s commitment to submit the 
investment court system to the CJEU as ofﬁ cially declared in the statement by the Kingdom 
of Belgium entered in the Council minutes: ‘Belgium will ask the European Court of Justice 
for an opinion on the compatibility of the ICS with the European treaties, in particular in 
the light of Opinion A-2/15’. Council of the EU, ‘Council Decision (EU) 2017/37 of 28 Octo-
ber 2016 on the signing on behalf of the European Union of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union 
and its Member States, of the other part’.
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approach. The ability of a regional parliament representing less than 1% 
of the EU population to signiﬁ cantly hinder the progress of the agree-
ment18 should have been understood as the ﬁ nal warning that the EU 
was about to lose its ability to act to conclude FTAs.19 
3 The Court’s opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA and mixity
The Lisbon Treaty does not provide precise contours of the scope of 
the CCP. Crucially, the Lisbon Treaty does not deﬁ ne foreign direct in-
vestment or intellectual property. It is also ambiguous on transport ser-
vices and the relationship between trade, transparency and sustainable 
development. This has led to numerous competence disputes between 
the Commission and the Council20 and, ﬁ nally, to the Court’s clariﬁ ca-
tion in Opinion 2/15. In this sense, Opinion 2/15 was ‘of such great rel-
evance’ because it ‘deﬁ ne[s] the limits of the common commercial policy, 
and determine[s] whether the latest Treaty reforms tell the tale of the 
EU’s empowerment in international trade and investment policy, or rath-
er that of inevitable mixity’.21 
The Court proceedings in this case were initiated by the Commis-
sion on 10 July 2015. To determine the legal nature of the EUSFTA and 
to avoid another CETA scenario, the Commission posed the following 
question to the CJEU:
18  Wallonia together with Brussels has a population of 1.8 m to the EU’s approximately 
510 m.
19  David Kleimann and Gesa Kübek, ‘After the “CETA Drama”, Toward a More Democratic 
EU Trade Policy’ (Politico, 12 January 2016) <www.politico.eu/article/opinion-after-the-ce-
ta-drama-toward-a-more-democratic-eu-trade-policy/> accessed 12 April 2018. Concerns 
associated with mixity were also recognised by Advocate-General Sharpston in her opinion: 
‘A ratiﬁ cation process involving all the Member States alongside the European Union is of 
necessity likely to be both cumbersome and complex. It may also involve the risk that the 
outcome of lengthy negotiations may be blocked by a few Member States or even by a single 
Member State. That might undermine the efﬁ ciency of EU external action and have negative 
consequences for the European Union’s relations with the third State(s) concerned’. Case 
A-2/15 Singapore FTA ECLI:EU:C:2016:992, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 565.
20  See eg Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo and Sanoﬁ -Aventis Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2013:520 
concerning intellectual property rights contained in the TRIPs Agreement or different posi-
tions of the European Commission and the Council regarding non-direct investment and 
ISDS: compare the European Commission’s draft regulation on ﬁ nancial responsibility and 
the ﬁ nal version ‘Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for managing ﬁ nancial responsibility 
linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agree-
ments to which the European Union is party’. 
21  Hannes Lenk, ‘Mixity in EU Foreign Trade Policy Is Here to Stay: Advocate General 
Sharpston on the Allocation of Competence for the Conclusion of the EU-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement’ (2017) 2(1) European Papers 6.
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Does the Union have the requisite competence to sign and conclude 
alone the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore? More speciﬁ cally,
1. which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union’s exclusive 
competence?
2. which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union’s shared 
competence? and
3. is there any provision of the agreement that falls within the exclusive 
competence of the Member States?22
The Commission, supported by the European Parliament, argued 
that all the provisions of the agreement fell within the exclusive com-
petence of the Union and had to be concluded by the Union alone. Con-
versely, the Council and 26 Member States argued that the agreement 
did not just cover exclusive competence and should be concluded as a 
mixed agreement. 
The resulting Opinion of the Court was issued 22 months later on 16 
May 2017. It covers a number of areas  of the EUSFTA as well as the gen-
eral issues related to the relationship between the EU and the Member 
States on matters of trade and investment: (1) Trade in goods; (2) Trade 
in services other than transport; (3) Transport services; (4) Government 
procurement; (5) Intellectual property; (6) Competition law; (7) Trade and 
sustainable development; (8) Investment; (9) Bilateral investments trea-
ties between the Member States and Singapore; and (10) Competence to 
approve the institutional provisions of the envisaged agreement.
The Court identiﬁ ed only two substantive areas of shared compe-
tence in the EUSFTA: non-direct forms of investments and investor-state 
dispute settlement. The Court found that the rest of the agreement fell 
within the Union’s exclusive competence. In contrast, Advocate-General 
Sharpston came to a different conclusion. In her opinion, the EU shared 
with Member States competence over transport services (and related 
government procurement), portfolio investment, ISDS, non-commercial 
aspects of intellectual property rights and some part of the sustainable 
development chapter with related provisions in the transparency, insti-
tutional and ﬁ nal chapters. Moreover, she even identiﬁ ed an exclusive 
competence of Member States in a provision regulating the termination 
of Member States’ bilateral investment agreements concluded with Sin-
gapore.23
22  Opinion A-2/15 Singapore FTA ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.
23  Opinion A-2/15, Opinion of AG Sharpston (n 19). For detailed analyses of Sharpston’s 
Opinion, see Lenk (n 21).
197CYELP 15 [2019] 189-214
For its conclusion, the Court mostly relied on its dictum in the Daii-
chi case24 to apply a ‘speciﬁ c link test’ to determine whether a particular 
provision of the Singapore FTA falls within the scope of Article 207 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):
36. It is settled case-law that the mere fact that an EU act, such as an 
agreement concluded by it, is liable to have implications for trade with 
one or more third States is not enough for it to be concluded that the act 
must be classiﬁ ed as falling within the common commercial policy. On 
the other hand, an EU act falls within that policy if it relates speciﬁ cally 
to such trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or 
govern such trade and has direct and immediate effects on it […].
37. It follows that only the components of the envisaged agreement that 
display a speciﬁ c link, in the above sense, with trade between the Eu-
ropean Union and the Republic of Singapore fall within the ﬁ eld of the 
common commercial policy.25
The Court applied this test in the Opinion and, as a result, the 
broad understanding of the scope of Article 207 TFEU has been con-
ﬁ rmed in line with previous case law applying a dynamic interpretation 
of the scope of the CCP.26 Beyond traditional areas of the CCP such as 
trade in goods and services other than transport, exclusive competence 
was found in the chapters on government procurement, competition, 
and perhaps surprisingly transport services and intellectual property. 
On transport services, the Court accepted that the ﬁ elds of maritime, 
rail and road transport are already largely covered by Union legislation 
employing a very low threshold when a policy ﬁ eld is considered to be 
largely covered.27 Regarding internal waterway transport, the Court did 
not refer to any EU legislation. However, due to the marginal scope of 
this ﬁ eld, the EU has the exclusive competence in respect of this chapter 
in its entirety.28 In the case of intellectual property, it is reafﬁ rmed by 
previous case law29 that its commercial aspects fall within the scope of 
the CCP. Nevertheless and notably, the Court’s assessment of reference 
to multilateral conventions which include a provision relating to moral 
rights as of an exclusive nature goes beyond an established scope.30 For 
24  Daiichi Sankyo (n 20) paras 51-52. See also Case C-137/12 Commission v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:675, para 57; Opinion A-3/15 Marrakesh Treaty on access to published 
works ECLI:EU:C:2017:114, para 61.
25  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) paras 36-37.
26  See eg Opinion 1/75 Local Cost Standard ECLI:EU:C:1975:145, 1361; Opinion 1/78 
Natural Rubber ECR 2871, para 44.
27  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22), para 180.
28  ibid, paras 216-217.
29  Daiichi Sankyo (n 20).
30  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) para 129.
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the purposes of this paper, it sufﬁ ces to further analyse two parts of the 
decision, investment protection and sustainable development, together 
with broader implications for mixity in EU agreements. 
3.1 Investment protection 
The Court’s ﬁ ndings on the market access implications of the in-
vestment chapter in EUSFTA are largely uncontroversial. The Court 
started its examination of investment protection by pointing out that 
the investment chapter in EUSFTA relates both to direct investment and 
to any other type of investment.31 The Court repeated its own deﬁ nition 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) as ‘investments of any kind made by 
natural or legal persons which serve to establish or maintain lasting 
and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the un-
dertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out 
an economic activity’.32 Subsequently, it applied this deﬁ nition to FDI in 
Article 207 TFEU with the unsurprising conclusion that the Union has 
exclusive competence in this area.33 It has always been understood by 
the Commission as well as the Council that the scope of the CCP covers 
market access and the promotion of FDI.34 
It was the post-establishment protections in EUSFTA − including 
the substantive investor protection and ISDS − that was the root of the 
ﬁ ercest disagreements between the Council and the Commission. Im-
portantly, the Court pointed out that the competence to conclude agree-
ments on foreign direct investment includes rules on the protection of 
existing investments.35 The Court then discussed the relevant clauses 
of the investment chapter and found that this framework ‘is intended to 
promote, facilitate and govern trade between the European Union and 
the Republic of Singapore, within the meaning of [the Daiichi case law]’. 
This is supported by the Court’s dictum ‘direct and immediate effects on 
... trade’ to justify its decision.36
As regards investment other than FDI, the Opinion contains one 
of the most signiﬁ cant conclusions − the use of the term in Article 207 
TFEU implies that the drafters of the Treaties did not intend to include 
other types of investment in the CCP. Accordingly, commitments vis-à-
31  ibid, para 79.
32  Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation ECLI:EU:C:2006:774, paras 
181-182; Case C-326/07 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2009:193, para 35.
33  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) paras 80-82.
34  Lenk (n 21) 16.
35  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) para 87.
36  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) para 94.
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vis a third State relating to other foreign investment do not fall within 
the exclusive competence of the European Union pursuant to Article 3(1)
(e) TFEU.37
This led to the question whether such other investment might still 
be an exclusive competence on the basis of the ERTA effect. The Commis-
sion had argued that Article 63 TFEU was itself a common rule that was 
affected by the Singapore FTA; therefore, according to the Commission, 
the ERTA effect of Article 3(2) TFEU implied that the EU had exclusive 
competence over indirect investment as well. By contrast, the Council 
had argued that, if indeed TFEU provisions were among the common 
rules that could be affected within the meaning of Article 3(2) TFEU, 
then the Treaty drafters could have written directly into the Treaty that 
the Union had exclusive external competence for capital movements. 
They did not do so. Moreover, Article 64(2) TFEU provides for a legal ba-
sis only for Union legislation on capital movements in the ﬁ eld of direct 
investments.
The Court dismissed the Commission’s arguments, agreeing with 
the Council that the ERTA case law does not permit a provision of prima-
ry law to be the ‘common rule’ affected by the international agreement. 
The Court started by recalling that:
non-direct foreign investment may, inter alia, take place in the form of 
the acquisition of company securities with the intention of making a ﬁ -
nancial investment without any intention to inﬂ uence the management 
and control of the undertaking (‘portfolio’ investments), and that such 
investments constitute movements of capital for the purposes of Article 
63 TFEU.38
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the primacy of the Treaties 
does not permit a secondary law act to have an impact on the meaning 
or scope of the Treaties’ provisions. International agreements therefore 
cannot ‘affect’ rules of primary EU law or ‘alter their scope’ within the 
meaning of Article 3(2) TFEU.39 Since none of the other situations under 
this provision are fulﬁ lled, the Court decided that the Union has no ex-
clusive competence to conclude an agreement relating to the protection 
of non-direct foreign investments.40
The Court went on to ﬁ nd that the conclusion of agreements on 
non-direct investment may prove necessary in order to achieve, with-
in the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred 
37  ibid, para 83.
38  ibid, para 227.
39  ibid, para 235.
40  ibid, para 238.
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to in the Treaties.41 Since Article 63 TFEU − being an internal market 
provision − is a shared competence as per Article 4(1) and (2)(a) TFEU, 
the competence for such an agreement would be shared. This novel rea-
soning will undeniably raise some question in the future, particularly 
in light of the fact that neither Article 4 TFEU, nor Article 63 TFEU, nor 
Article 64 TFEU provide for competence for the Union to legislate in the 
ﬁ eld of portfolio investment.
Regarding ISDS, the Court found the mechanism to be under shared 
competence, because it ‘removes disputes from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the Member States’.42 By acknowledging the competence of the 
Member States in the area of ISDS, it is likely that the Court would ap-
ply the same ﬁ nding in the case of other investment dispute settlement 
mechanisms proposed by the EU: that is, a system of investment court 
(ICS) and a multilateral investment court (MIC).
3.2 Sustainable development
Regarding the chapter regulating sustainable development issues, 
the question was whether this chapter could be concluded under the 
EU exclusive competences governing the CCP. The Court started its dis-
cussion of the sustainable development chapter by recalling that the 
EUSFTA is a ‘new generation’ trade agreement, ‘that is to say, a trade 
agreement including … other aspects that are relevant, or even essen-
tial, to … trade’.43 The Court then pointed out that the Treaty of Lisbon 
considerably amended the CCP. It stressed the second sentence of Article 
207(1) TFEU: ‘The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the 
context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action’. 
The principles and objectives of the EU’s external action are spelled out 
in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Paragraph (2)(f) 
of that Article tasks the Union with ‘help[ing] develop international mea-
sures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the 
sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure 
sustainable development’.
The Court, referring to Articles 21(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), 205 and 207 TFEU, subsequently concluded that the Union 
is obliged to integrate these objectives and principles into its CCP.44 In 
addition, the Court referred to Articles 9 and 11 TFEU, which require the 
integration of social and environmental requirements in all Union poli-
41  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) paras 239-242.
42  ibid, para 292.
43  ibid, para 140.
44  ibid, para 143.
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cies. The Court concluded that ‘the objective of sustainable development 
henceforth forms an integral part of the common commercial policy’.45
The Council, which argued that all sustainable development provi-
sions are not part of the CCP, had pointed out that part of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions covered by Article 13.3(3) 
of the Agreement involves matters for which the Union explicitly has no 
competence. For example, Article 153(5) TFEU explicitly excludes any 
competence on, among other things, the right of association of workers. 
The Court dealt with this argument by ﬁ nding that the EUSFTA just 
refers to such agreements without any implications to their scope or 
division of competence. In addition, the Court applied again its Daiichi 
‘direct and immediate effects on … trade’ test.46 On this basis, it ﬁ nds 
that the sustainable development chapter falls within the scope of Article 
207 TFEU. 
One commentator noted that the ‘answer of the Court was a re-
sounding yes in favour of the EU exclusive competence on sustainable 
development [...]’.47 Nevertheless, we must be aware of the limitations 
of extensive interpretation by joint bodies established by the Parties or 
adopting a more ambitious approach in other negotiations. 
3.3 Multiple faces of mixity 
Summarising the whole Opinion, the Court found that most of the 
EUSFTA falls within the exclusive competence of the Union, but portfolio 
investment, ISDS and related ancillary provisions that fall within the 
competence shared between the Union and the Member States,48 un-
der which the agreement could not be approved ‘by the European Union 
alone’.49 Did this formulation mean the end of ‘facultative mixity’ in the 
sense that the EU could also conclude an agreement covered by shared 
competences alone if the Council so decides? The Court provided a clar-
iﬁ cation shortly after Opinion 2/15. In the COTIF judgment, the Court 
made it clear that the Council can still agree that mixity is not required 
and an agreement is so concluded only by the EU alone, without the par-
ticipation of the Member States.50 
45  ibid, para 147.
46  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) paras 155, 157-161.
47  Giovanni Gruni, ‘Towards a Sustainable World Trade Law? The Commercial Policy of 
the European Union After Opinion 2/15 CJEU’ (2018) 12(1) Global Trade and Customs 
Journal 5.
48  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) para 305.
49  ibid, paras 244, 282, 304.
50  Case C-600/14 Council v Germany (OTIF) ECLI:EC:C:2017:935, para 68.
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However, this possibility in fact does not change much in the con-
text of investment protection. First, the likelihood of consensus among 
the Member States to let the EU conclude such an agreement alone is for 
numerous political reasons low, almost impossible.51 Second, facultative 
mixity is excluded in the case of ISDS or a comparable mechanism, as 
it removes disputes from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member 
States. The right of the claimant investor to submit a dispute to ISDS 
under an agreement, without Member States being able to oppose this, 
takes a dispute away from their domestic courts. For the Court itself, 
such a mechanism ‘cannot, therefore, be established without the Mem-
ber States’ consent’.52 The Court’s explicit request for Member States’ 
consent leads to the conclusion that there is not even a hypothetical 
option for the Council to decide whether an FTA with an investment 
chapter or an investment agreement covering any form of investor-state 
dispute settlement could be concluded by the EU alone.53 In the case of 
ISDS, ICS or MIC, ‘mandatory mixity’ will thus apply. Needless to say, 
investment protection provided for investors is signiﬁ cantly weaker with-
out an effective dispute settlement system.
The implications of the Court’s recent ﬁ ndings in Opinion 2/15 for 
the treatment of investment protection, ISDS and sustainable develop-
ment in relation to other EU agreements need careful consideration. In 
fact, the Court’s Opinion constitutes a strong precedent for future ne-
gotiations because EU FTAs have a similar structure. The Opinion in-
vited the EU to reconsider an architecture of pending and future FTAs 
between the EU and Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, India, and Indonesia, 
among others, with legal implications for their following ratiﬁ cation pro-
cedure with respect to the division of competences. 
4 Shaping post-Lisbon Common Commercial Policy 2.0 
4.1 New architecture adopted in the light of Opinion 2/15
When planning the scope of FTAs, policymakers must consider their 
purpose and the context within which the envisaged treaties are ne-
gotiated. Governments should set priorities and have realistic expecta-
tions about the policies that will emerge from negotiations. Under the 
current conditions of change in global trade and investment ﬂ ows and 
51  Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘Quo Vadis EU Investment Law and Policy? The Shaky path 
Towards the International Promotion of EU Rules’ (2018) 23(2) European Foreign Affairs 
Law 184.
52  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) para 292.
53  Luca Prete, ‘Some Thoughts on Facultative and Obligatory Mixity after Singapore and 
COTIF, and before CETA’ (18 October 2018) VerfBlog.
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the deepening of economic globalisation that have led to closer linkages 
between trade and investment, governments have increasingly reﬂ ected 
this trend in negotiating comprehensive FTAs. 
It was NAFTA’s investment chapter which in 1994 signalled a new 
era where investment issues are addressed in comprehensive FTAs. Ac-
cording to a recent study, investment provisions are part of 450 FTAs 
in force today.54 Another empirical study conﬁ rms a rising tendency of 
including investment chapters in FTAs.55 There is a growing corpus of 
studies arguing for the increasing convergence of trade and investment 
law creating normative coherence.56 Some of these studies even charac-
terise the current situation where still only a handful of FTAs cover both 
trade and investment as an artiﬁ cial separation between the regimes.57 
These views are supported by an expansion of global value chains. 
FDI can stimulate positive spillovers, while investments have crucial im-
portance in the creation and expansion of productive supply capacities.58 
It is undeniable that the expansion of global value chains over the past 
decades has changed patterns of trade and FDI, and rendered them more 
complex and inter-dependent. Global value chains go beyond trade and 
investment policies and involve other policy areas, such as competition 
policy, intellectual property rights, standards and data ﬂ ows. There is 
a broad scope of provisions relevant for the operations of multinational 
enterprises and this is reﬂ ected in recent complex FTAs that have chap-
ters addressing a variety of policy issues. Besides, due to some common-
alities and overlapping aspects among the regimes, it seems natural to 
situate both systems of laws in FTAs.59 The operations of foreign inves-
tors have become more sophisticated and their investments are always 
54  Wolfgang Alschner, ‘The Investment Component in Trade Agreements’ in Robert Looney 
(ed), Routledge Handbook in International Trade Agreements (Routledge 2018) 79.
55  Maksim Usyninm and Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘The Growing Tendency of Including In-
vestment Chapters in PTAs’ in F Amtenbrink and others (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 2017 (TMC Asser Press 2018) 288.
56  Tomer Broude, ‘Investment and Trade: The “Lottie and Lisa” of International Economic 
Law?’ in Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law 
and Policy (CUP 2013); Gary Hufbauer and Tyler Moran, Investment and Trade Regimes 
Conjoined: Economic Facts and Regulatory Frameworks (International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development 2015); Jürgen Kurtz, The WTO and International Investment Law: 
Converging Systems (CUP 2016).
57  Eg Gary Hufbauer and Gary Clyde, ‘Rules of the International Trade, Investment, and 
Financial Systems: What They Deliver, How They Differ, the Way Forward’ (2014) 17(4) 
Journal of International Economic Law 833.
58  UNCTAD, ‘Trade and Development Report 2013’ (United Nations 2013) 87.
59  For an opposite view, see eg Simon Lester, ‘Lessons from Europe for US Trade Policy: 
Is It Time to Separate Trade Liberalization and Investment Protection?’ (Hufﬁ ngton Post, 
21 September 2017) <www.hufﬁ ngtonpost.com/entry/lessons-from-europe-for-us-trade-
policy-is-it-time_us_59c10df7e4b0f96732cbc8fe> accessed 6 March 2018. 
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combined with other types of relationships. It is not only trade and in-
vestment liberalisation that is complementary, but a broader set of be-
hind-the-border regulations. The prime example of this development is 
the recently signed and provisionally applied CETA, frequently described 
as a ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTA with regard to its content. In addition, 
expanded competence in the Lisbon treaty allowed the Union to be at the 
forefront of the development of international investment law and policy.60 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of investment provisions in FTAs is 
among the most contested issues at a time when trade liberalisation is 
facing growing domestic opposition. Many policymakers in the EU can 
have the feeling that their life may be much easier due to simpliﬁ ed ratiﬁ -
cation without investment protection and ISDS being covered. The CIEU’s 
Opinion 2/15 rose to the expectation of a departure from the practice of 
mixed EU FTAs. By decoupling investment chapters from FTAs, the EU 
could conclude trade agreements by itself, without the Member States. 
Accordingly, such EU-only negotiations and the signature and conclu-
sion of FTAs would reduce the amount of veto-rights and minimise the 
transaction costs of trade governance.61 Finally, the investment chapter 
risks protracting negotiations or compromising the whole agreement
In alignment with this approach, the Commission already in au-
tumn 2017 admitted that ‘the debate on the best architecture for EU 
trade agreements and investment protection agreements must be com-
pleted’. In the same breath, it stressed that ‘the EU must be a credible 
negotiating partner: our institutional decision-making must be clear, 
predictable and ﬁ t for purpose’.62 Accordingly, the state of thinking in 
the Commission could have been easily foreseen. The splitting of FTAs 
was subsequently adopted in the Council’s conclusions on the negotia-
tion and conclusion of FTAs in May 201863 and the new practice is taking 
place in current and upcoming negotiations in which the investment 
part will be segregated from the rest of the provisions. 
The conclusions now set out the Council’s key principles towards 
trade and investment negotiations with a focus on distinguishing be-
60  Federico Ortino and Piet Eeckhout, ‘Towards an EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investment’ 
in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP 2012) 
327.
61  David Kleimann, ‘Beyond the Shadow of the Veto: Economic Treaty-Making in the Euro-
pean Union after Opinion 2/15’ in Elaine Fahey (ed), Institutionalisation Beyond the Nation 
State (Springer 2018) 166.
62  Commission, ‘A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness Globalisation’ (13 
September 2017) 6.
63  Council of the European Union, ‘Outcome of the Outcome Meeting, 3618th Council 
meeting’ (22 May 2018) <www.consilium.europa.eu/media/34837/st09102-en18.pdf> ac-
cessed 2 June 2018.
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tween separate provisions related to investment and other trade provi-
sions. In other words, the EU itself will conclude the main trade agree-
ment while a separate side investment treaty will be subject to ratiﬁ ca-
tion in all Member States. The CETA saga played an important role as a 
‘wake-up call’. Several authors considered the Commission’s acceptance 
of the mixed nature of the CETA as regaining some trade competences.64 
But Opinion 2/15 and the subsequent development neutralised this ad-
vantage of the Council over the Commission. The apparent risk that the 
EU might become incapable of concluding FTAs in the future and also 
might lose credibility with its partners forced Member States to give up 
mixity and the unanimity rule. Given this, the Council conclusions have 
signiﬁ cant ramiﬁ cations for the CCP.
Evidence of this new approach is already observed in several re-
cently concluded and ongoing negotiations. The EUSFTA, as the direct 
subject of Opinion 2/15, ﬁ rst reﬂ ected this new architecture. On 18 April 
2018, the Commission presented to the Council the result of the EUS-
FTA and divided the original agreement into two new agreements: the 
EU-Singapore Trade Agreement and the EU-Singapore Investment Pro-
tection Agreement (IPA).65 The initially negotiated text for a comprehen-
sive FTA with Vietnam followed the pattern of the EUSFTA to create two 
self-standing agreements: the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement under 
EU-exclusive competence, and the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection 
Agreement under mixed competence.66
Similar developments took place with regard to EU negotiations with 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In the case of Japan, an agreement 
in principle on the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
was reached on 7 July 2017. Nevertheless, Japan has openly opposed the 
EU reform approach in investment protection and investment dispute 
settlement.67 The investment part was then pragmatically separated due 
64  Kurt Hübner, Anne-Sophie Deman and Tugce Balik, ‘EU and Trade Policy-making: The 
Contentious Case of CETA’ (2017) 39(7) Journal of European Integration 851.
65  Commission, ‘Press Release: Key Elements of the EU-Singapore Trade and Investment 
Agreements’ (18 April 2018) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1827> 
accessed 3 March 2018.
66  Commission, ‘Commission Presents EU-Vietnam Trade and Investment Agreements for 
Signature and Conclusion’ (17 October 2018) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=1921> accessed 25 December 2018.
67  See, eg, Anthea Roberts, ‘UNCITRAL and ISDS Reform: Pluralism and the Plurilateral 
Investment Court’, EJIL: Talk! (12 December 2017) <www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-re-
form-pluralism-and-the-plurilateral-investment-court/> accessed 11 April 2018. The Jap-
anese negative stance is likely the result of a combination of several causes. Japan has nev-
er faced an investment claim and, with regard to the level of the rule of law in the Member 
States of the EU, there is no strong motivation for Japanese companies to push investment 
protection in the negotiations. In addition, the Japanese government faced a hard-fought 
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to these irreconcilable differences between the two sides in order not 
to delay the approval of the entire FTA. In this regard, the decision has 
been vindicated, as the EPA between the EU and Japan entered into 
force on 1 February 2019. Considering Australia and New Zealand, the 
Commission submitted draft directives for negotiations to the Council in 
September 2019. The draft mandates do not include an investment part 
and they are thus limited to substance covered by the EU exclusive com-
petence.68 In this regard, the directives were also approved by the Coun-
cil.69 What is important is that the other crucial European institution, 
the European Parliament, expressed support for this approach stated in 
its resolution for trade negotiations with Australia (and identically with 
New Zealand):
on the Commission and the Council to put forward a proposal as soon 
as possible about the general future architecture of trade agreements 
taking into account CJEU Opinion 2/15 on the EU-Singapore FTA, and 
to clearly distinguish between a trade and liberalisation of foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) agreement, containing only issues that fall within 
the EU’s exclusive competence, and a potential second agreement which 
covers subjects whose competences are shared with Member States.70 
It should be recalled that this approach is not entirely new because 
the EU has already pursued investment liberalisation through both FTAs 
and stand-alone investment agreements.71 Still, the EU investment pol-
icy reliant only on investment treaties cannot use the potential leverage 
provided by being a part of an FTA. Comprehensive trade and investment 
agreements allow for more far-reaching ‘package deals’ and quid pro quo 
compromises across various chapters.72 In the context of the EU, it may 
battle and invested much political capital to persuade the public and lawmakers to accept 
ISDS in the TPP.
68  Commission, ‘Annex to the Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorising the 
Opening of Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with Australia’ (13 September 2017); 
Commission, ‘Annex to the Recommendation for a Council Decision Authorising the Open-
ing of Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with New Zealand’ (13 September 2017).
69  Council of the European Union, ‘Negotiating Directives for a Free Trade Agreement with 
Australia’ (25 June 2018); Council of the European Union, ‘Negotiating Directives for a Free 
Trade Agreement with New Zealand’ (25 June 2018).
70  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 26 October 2017 Containing the Parliament’s 
Recommendation to the Council on the Proposed Negotiating Mandate for Trade Negotiations 
with Australia’ (2017) para 10.
71  Eg investment negotiations with China, see Commission, ‘Press Release: EU and Chi-
na Begin Investment Talks’ (20 January 2014) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=1013&title=EU-and-China-begin-investment-talks> accessed 19 May 2018.
72  Steffen Hindelang, Jurgita Baur and Stephan Schill, ‘EU Investment Protection after the 
ECJ Opinion on Singapore: Questions of Competence and Coherence. Study Requested by 
the INTA Committee. Policy’, Department for External Relations of the European Parliament 
(25 March 2019) 23.
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also use its market size to assert forcefully speciﬁ c goals in negotia-
tions. Saying this, it is necessary to highlight that in order to pursue its 
ambitious reform goals,73 including the establishment of a multilateral 
investment court, it is essential for the EU to be able to use any lever-
age. As a consequence, for the purposes of promoting its new approach, 
the EU investment policy has likely suffered a serious blow as a result 
of the policy decision.74 Without the leverage of the rest of the FTAs, the 
Commission’s negotiators face a more challenging task to persuade its 
partners to adopt the EU reform proposals, regardless of other factors, 
such as market size, the previous trade and investment relationship with 
a third country, and its own developed treaty policy. 
As the public consultation on investment protection and ISDS in the 
TTIP showed,75 the Commission has struggled to ﬁ nd continuity while 
putting together a common investment policy acceptable for a broad spec-
trum of domestic stakeholders. Moreover, in its recent Opinion 1/17,76 
the Court not only ruled on the compatibility of CETA’s investment chap-
ter with EU law, but set conditions for the future investment rules in EU 
agreements.77 Now, there is an increasing risk that the EU proposals 
will become unacceptable for a number of third countries. This may un-
dermine the widely shared perception that the new competence in the 
Lisbon treaty allows the Union to be at the forefront of the development 
of international investment law and policy.78  
73  In the ‘Trade for All’ strategy, the European Commission declared that the EU is best 
placed and has special responsibility in the reform of the global investment regime ‘as its 
founder and main actor’.
74  Elsa Sardinha, ‘The New EU-Led Approach to Investor-State Arbitration: The Investment 
in the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU−Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement’ (2017) 32(3) ICSID Review 627. Similarly, speaking of ‘undermining the EU’s 
role as powerful driver of reform in international investment law’ see Philip Hainbach, ‘The 
CJEU’s Opinion 2/15 and the Future of EU Investment Policy and Law-Making’ (2018) 45(2) 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 200.
75  For more information, see Ondrˇej Svoboda, ‘TTIP and ISDS: Not Irreconcilable Acronyms’ 
(2015) 6 Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law 352.
76  Opinion A-1/17 CETA ECLI:EU:C:2019:341.
77  Marc Bungenberg and Catharine Titi, ‘CETA Opinion-Setting Conditions for the Future 
of ISDS’, EJIL: Talk! (5 June 2019) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/ceta-opinion-setting-
conditions-for-the-future-of-isds/> accessed 18 July 2019.
78  Ortino and Eeckhout (n 60) 327.
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Scheme of the new EU FTA architecture
4.2 Coupling investment protection and sustainable development: 
an alternative path 
The approach adopted by the Commission and the Council after 
Opinion 2/15 is logical. However, one may feel that EU policymakers 
could be more innovative and ambitious in considering the next steps. 
While decoupling investment protection from trade issues for the sake of 
the exclusivity of trade agreements is understandable, the Court’s rea-
soning also has important implications for trade policymakers in the ﬁ eld 
of sustainable development, which may not be apparent at ﬁ rst blush. 
FTAs’ salience in addressing non-economic concerns such as protec-
tion of the environment and labour standards has been frequently criti-
cised by politicians, trade unions and civil society. The Commission’s com-
munication ‘Trade for All’ reﬂ ected this trend, recognising the importance 
of this issue for many EU citizens, ‘with many asking whether it [the trade 
policy] is designed to support broad European interests and principles or 
the narrow objectives of large ﬁ rms’.79 To recognise the increasing con-
cerns of citizens about social and environmental conditions in the coun-
tries the EU trades with has certainly been a step in the right direction.80
79  Commission, ‘Trade for All - Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy’ 
(14 October 2015) 18.
80  Ricard Bellera i Kirchhoff, ‘Trade for Fairness’ in Patricia Garcia-Duran and Montserrat 
Millet (eds), Different Glances at EU Trade Policy (CIDOB 2016) 48.
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Following Opinion 2/15, the Commission has had the opportunity 
to be bolder, as the EU exclusive competence in this ﬁ eld is no longer 
disputed under current drafting. As a result of the Court’s reasoning, 
broader sustainable development could be construed as an integral and 
effective part of the CCP, which is often criticised for disregarding so-
cio-environmental concerns and favouring business at the expense of 
public interests. Despite the EU negotiating sustainable development 
provisions in its trade agreements since the 1990s, the result of this 
effort has been considered disappointing and has given rise to the ques-
tion of how the trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters can 
be strengthened.81 
The internal considerations have already been initiated. The ﬁ rst 
sign of this direction is the re-emerged debate on the dispute settlement 
mechanism for the TSD chapters that could include state-to-state con-
sultation and dispute mechanisms, as well as the means to the easier 
participation of civil society.82 The Commission has recently committed 
itself to promoting these improvements and pursuing the enforcement of 
the covered commitments in the TSD chapters under a ‘more assertive 
approach’.83 Other improvements can be implemented in drafting robust 
labour and environmental standards going beyond mere references to 
other international treaties or such general wording that is only of a 
declaratory nature.84 Also in this ﬁ eld, the European Parliament (which 
has repeatedly called for improvement here)85 has already expressed its 
view in the context of the then approaching negotiations with Australia 
(and New Zealand): 
[I]n view of CJEU Opinion 2/15 on the EU-Singapore FTA that trade 
and sustainable development fall within the EU’s exclusive competence 
81  For instance, one analysis found no evidence that the existence of EU TSD chapters has 
led to improvements in labour standards governance. See James Harrison and others, ‘Gov-
erning Labour Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of the European Union’s 
Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters’ (2019) 57(2) Journal of Common Market 
Studies 273.
82  Commission, ‘Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapters in EU Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs)’ (11 July 2017) 7. See also Francesca Romain Jacur, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Recent Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements: An Early Assess-
ment’ (2018) 23(4) European Foreign Affairs Review 478-481; Kate ina Hradilová and Ond ej 
Svoboda, ‘Sustainable Development Chapters in the EU Free Trade Agreements: Searching 
for Effectiveness’ (2018) 52(6) Journal of World Trade 1019. 
83  Commission, ‘Non Paper of the Commission Services: Feedback and Way Forward on 
Improving the Implementation and Enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development 
Chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’ (26 February 2018).
84  Gruni (n 47) 6.
85  See eg European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 14 March 2019 on the Annual Strategic 
Report on the Implementation and Delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’ 
(2019) 25.
210 Ondrˇej Svoboda: The Common Commercial Policy after Opinion 2/15
and that sustainable development forms an integral part of the EU’s 
common commercial policy, a robust and ambitious sustainable develop-
ment chapter is an indispensable part of any potential agreement; provi-
sions for effective tools for dialogue, monitoring and cooperation, includ-
ing binding and enforceable provisions which are subject to suitable and 
effective dispute settlement mechanisms, and consider, among various 
enforcement methods, a sanctions-based mechanism, while enabling 
social partners and civil society to participate appropriately, as well as 
close cooperation with experts from relevant multilateral organisations.86
The new tendency to promote sustainable issues more forcefully is 
also evident in the ﬁ rst ever activation of a state-to-state dispute set-
tlement mechanism under an EU trade and sustainable development 
chapter. At the end of 2018, the EU began government consultations with 
the Republic of Korea regarding the country’s implementation of labour 
commitments related to the EU-Korea FTA.87 Almost at the same time, 
fundamental ILO Conventions were raised by the European Parliament 
in the context of the approaching signing of the EU-Vietnam FTA.88 With 
the new European Parliament, a stronger push for sustainability in the 
CCP is expected.89 The latest developments conﬁ rm this trend. Ursula 
von der Leyen, currently the President-elect of the European Commis-
sion, has instructed a Commissioner-designate for Trade Phil Hogan to 
‘use our trade tools to support sustainable development’ as ‘every new 
trade agreement concluded will have a dedicated chapter on sustainable 
development’. Moreover, the Commissioner should work with a newly 
created position of Chief Enforcement Ofﬁ cer in order to closely moni-
tor the implementation of climate, environmental and labour protections 
enshrined in EU FTAs.90 This direction will be likely supported by the 
Council, as some Member States call for stringent rules in the TSD chap-
ter. For instance, France openly advocates the implementation of binding 
sustainable development provisions where non-compliance may be sub-
ject to a dispute settlement mechanism.91
86  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 26 October 2017 Containing the Parliament’s Rec-
ommendation to the Council on the Proposed Negotiating Mandate for Trade Negotiations 
with Australia’ (2017) 19(g).
87  Commission, ‘EU Team in Korea for Government Consultations over Labour Commitments 
under the Trade Agreement’ (21 January 2019). 
88  European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 15 November 2018 on Vietnam, Notably the 
Situation of Political Prisoners’ (2018).
89  Iana Dreyer, ‘Comment: Greener or Messier EU Trade Policy Going Forward?’ Borderlex 
(28 May 2019).
90  Commission, ‘Mission letter to Phil Hogan, Commissioner-designate for Trade’ (10 
September 2019) 5.
91  Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, ‘The French Government’s Trade Policy’ <www.
diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/economic-diplomacy-foreign-trade/the-
french-government-s-trade-policy/> accessed 17 September 2019.
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However, there is further potential for expanding and heightening 
the speciﬁ city of provisions on labour, environmental protection, climate 
change, corporate social responsibility and responsible business con-
duct, etc. An ambitious and perhaps necessary92 development in this di-
rection can have an impact on the division of competence, and ultimately 
re-introduce mixity in FTAs, even without investment protection.
The Court stressed that the purpose of the chapter is not to harmo-
nise the social and environmental legislations of the Parties.93 However, 
the subsequent implementation of the EUSFTA could eventually lead to 
the Parties’ effort for synergy and new commitments in these ﬁ elds.94 
Such a trend is already visible in the case of the CETA. In September 
2018, the CETA Joint Committee issued its Recommendation on Trade, 
Climate Action and the Paris Agreement, recognising ‘the importance 
of achieving the purpose and goals of the Paris Agreement’ and recom-
mending 
that the Parties cooperate, work together and take joint actions as rele-
vant to address climate change and promote the mutual supportiveness 
of trade and climate policies, rules and measures thereby contributing 
to the purpose and goals of the Paris Agreement and the transition to 
low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development’.95 
Reading the recommendation, there is a clearly expressed intention 
of the Parties to develop deeper cooperation under the FTA framework 
in the future. Current provisions on sustainable development can thus 
serve as a platform for the extensive application and interpretation of 
the CETA, consequently possibly going beyond the limits of exclusive 
competence found by the Court in Opinion 2/15. The approach will be 
likely promoted by the EU in regard to other FTAs concluded or currently 
under negotiation.
It is important to add that under new FTAs, sustainable develop-
ment can become the concern not only of the Parties, but also of inves-
tors. Comprehensive FTAs provide important opportunities for aligning 
international objectives of legal protection for foreign investors and sus-
tainable development. From this perspective, for some authors, imposing 
actionable responsibilities constitutes the next logical step for compre-
92  See discussion in Martin Sandbu, ‘Europe Uses Trade Deals to Push for Climate Change 
Action’, Financial Times (London 8 July 2019) <www.ft.com/content/6d026308-9f0e-11e9-
b8ce-8b459ed04726> accessed 15 July 2019.
93  Opinion A-2/15 (n 22) para 165.
94  Charlotte Beaucillon, ‘Opinion 2/15: Sustainable Is the New Trade. Rethinking Coherence 
for the New Common Commercial Policy’ (2017) 2(3) European Papers 827.
95  Recommendation 001/2018 of the CETA Joint Committee on trade, climate action and 
the Paris Agreement (26 September 2018).
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hensive FTAs.96 Arbitral or judicial innovation may also be a possible 
development with regard to investor responsibilities.97 Some EU Member 
States have begun to promote and deepen sustainable development stan-
dards in their new model bilateral treaties98 and the EU as a whole may 
start developing a similar approach soon.
A more active approach in this direction should also be welcomed 
from the systematic perspectives of the CCP under the Treaties. Accord-
ing to Article 207(1) TFEU, the CCP must be formulated and implemented 
in accordance with the general objectives and principles of EU external 
relations stipulated in Article 9 TFEU and Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU.99 
Moreover, civil society and the trade unions in the EU consider sustain-
able development to be an essential element of trade policy. If chapters in 
the FTAs become more effective in promoting EU standards, they have 
the potential to improve the negative public perception of FTAs and the 
CCP in general.
Finally, evidence has already been provided that despite the exclu-
sive nature of the current TSD chapter, the Member States are still able 
to intervene strongly in FTA negotiations. Allegedly, France resolutely 
calls on the EU to make a new policy in trade negotiations: ‘No Paris 
Agreement, no trade agreement’.100 In this way, France practically threat-
ens to stand against each FTA which does not include Paris Agreement 
references. Member States can thus still block any FTA politically or le-
gally in the Council if they assess sustainable development commitment 
as unsatisfactory.
96  Peter Muchlinski, ‘Negotiating New Generation International Investment Agreements’ 
in Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski (eds), Shifting Paradigms in International In-
vestment Law: More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversiﬁ ed (OUP 2016) 41; Belen 
Olmos Giupponi, ‘Squaring the Circle? Balancing Sustainable Development and Investment 
Protection in the EU Investment Policy’ (2016) 25(2) European Energy and Environmen-
tal Law Review 49-52; Emily R Hush, ‘Where No Man Has Gone Before: The Future of 
Sustainable Development in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and New 
Generation Free Trade Agreements’ (2018) 43(1) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 
157; Maria Chochorelou and Carlos E Berdd, ‘Sustainable Development in New Generation 
FTAs: Could Arbitrators Further the Principle through ISDS?’ (2018) 27(2) Review of Euro-
pean, Comparative and International Environmental Law 185.
97  Urbaser SA et al v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26; Burlington Resources, Inc v 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5.
98  Netherlands Model Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(2019); Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) Model Agreement on Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (2019).
99  Angelos Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of 
the Common Commercial Policy’ (2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Review 153.
100  Gregory Viscusi, ‘Macron Says No Trade Deals Without Climate Treaty Compliance’, 
Bloomber (25 September 2018) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-25/macron-
says-no-trade-deals-without-complying-with-climate-treaty> accessed 29 June 2019.
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5 Conclusion
The Court’s case law on the CCP is a remarkable tale of expanding 
exclusive external competence of the Union which has enabled the EU 
to become a global trade power. Opinion 2/15 on the EUSFTA was the 
ﬁ rst opportunity for the Court to comprehensively assess the post-Lisbon 
CCP, including the scope of foreign direct investment. Accordingly, the 
Opinion undoubtedly has signiﬁ cant consequences for any recently con-
cluded, ongoing or future trade and investment negotiations, including 
the EUSFTA itself. This will have a systematic impact on the whole of 
the CCP as FTAs have become the dominant form of trade cooperation of 
our times, achieving market opening as well as better regulatory gover-
nance.101 At the same time, trade policy becomes more contentious and 
politicised than ever before. The debate about costs and beneﬁ ts of FTAs 
continues and its focus shifts to the concept of fair trade.
This development has a potential to draw further negative public at-
tention. As opposition to trade negotiations with Canada and the United 
States showed, the campaign mobilised by European NGOs against both 
FTA negotiations heavily inﬂ uenced public opinion in the short term, 
and represented the largest civil society movement in the EU’s history.102 
In spite of the fact that Eurobarometer data currently shows that over 
70% of Europeans support the CCP and consider free trade to be posi-
tive,103 this recent history indicates that maintaining public support will 
not always be simple. The EU should face internal challenges with inno-
vative, inclusive and courageous thinking. 
Mixity does not imply an easy route for the ratiﬁ cation of any in-
ternational agreement signed by the EU and its Member States. Actions 
by national or regional parliaments, interventions of stakeholders and 
rulings by national courts may threaten the successful conclusion of 
FTAs in the future, as the example of the CETA has proved.104 But the 
Commission’s decision to separate the trade and investment parts of FTA 
negotiations, for the sake of exclusivity, is not a sign of brave thinking.
The ‘Trade for All’ strategy shows that the Commission has been 
more attentive to public concerns. The EU has already slowly embraced 
101  Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, ‘Introduction: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Pref-
erential Trade Agreements’ in Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig (eds), Trade Cooperation: The 
Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements (CUP 2015) 1, 19.
102  Kurt Hübner, Anne-Sophie Deman and Tugce Balik, ‘EU and Trade Policy-making: The 
Contentious Case of CETA’ (2017) 39(7) Journal of European Integration 853.
103  Commission, ‘Special Eurobarometer 461’ (April 2017); Commission, ‘Standard Barom-
eter 89: Spring’ (March 2018).
104  The agreement is still under the process of ratiﬁ cation in all of the thirty-eight national 
and regional parliaments.
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FTAs as an instrument for sustainability. Sustainable development re-
mains, after Opinion 2/15, within the scope of the CCP. Nevertheless, the 
expansion of the scope in this ﬁ eld is limited within the boundaries of 
exclusivity. To address internal challenges of the CCP in terms of popu-
lar legitimacy and to manage expectations, the EU institution will likely 
need to advance beyond those boundaries. In the light of volatile public 
and political support for the CCP and free trade in general, sustainable 
development and the wider promotion of non-commercial interests can 
signal a positive dimension of FTAs for the public. Regarding invest-
ment protection, mixity is here to stay, particularly in the case of ISDS 
or similar mechanisms, where mandatory mixity is to be preserved. In 
addition, any effort for a simpler procedure in concluding exclusive FTAs 
may come at the expense of incorporating new areas into FTAs such 
anti-corruption or consumer protection105 which could add further ele-
ments of mixity to those agreements. Decoupling investment protection 
from trade aspects may also be detrimental to the coherence and ambi-
tions of the EU investment policy to be a leading ﬁ gurehead shaping and 
reforming international investment law, even if it ensures public support 
for new agreements in the short-term.106
Many challenges lie ahead for the CCP in terms of enhancing sus-
tainable development standards and providing investment protection at 
the same time. Comprehensive FTAs encompassing trade, investment 
and sustainability deserve a second thought. 
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